I
The dialectical relationship between model shurüt works and juridical practice represents one fundamental instance in which juristic doctrine and the realia of practice conflate to produce a constant modification of the law, both as an abstracted doctrine recorded in legal manuals and as practiced in a worldly social context. ^ Being an integral segment of the less specialised adab al-qadi literature,^ the shurüt, I propose, are no less subject to the rales of this dialectical relationship than the larger textual context of which it constituted such an organic part.^ In this article I discuss the modalities of written communication prevalent among the qàdi^, a subject that occupies space in both adab al-qàdi works and the shurüt manuals."^ The usual Arabic designation for this type of An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Joseph Schacht Conference on Theory and Practice in Islamic Law, held in Granada in December [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 1997 .
' On model shurüt works and their dialectical relationship to practice, see Hallaq, W. B., «Model Shurüt Works and the Dialectic of Doctrine and Practice», Islamic Law and Society, 2 (1995) , 109-134. ^ In as much as independent works were exclusively devoted to the shurüt genre, there are a number of adab al-qàdi and furü' works which include, as an integral part of their discourse, a section on shurüt See, for example, Shiháb al-Dîn Ibrahim Ibn AM al- Damm, Kitàb Adab alQadà ' aw al-Durar al-Manzumàt fi al-Aqdiya wal-Hukumàt, éd. Muhammad Ahmad 'Ata (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1407 /1987 Shams al-Dïn aÍ-Sarakhsí, al-Mabsüt, 30 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at al-Sa'àda, 1906-12) , XXX, 'Abd Allah Ibn Salmun alKinânî, ISS3), passim; éd., , 6 vols, (repr., Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ' al-Turáth al-'Arabî, 1400/1980), VI, 160-389.
^ The argument can, of course, be taken to its logical conclusion. Conceptually, adab alqâdi works also form an integral part of the much larger and less specialised literature offurü', a category which is inclusive of all areas of substantive (and adjectival) law that is, in many ways, the product of the very distinct methodology and theory of law (usul al-fiqh) . But due to the enormous dimensions of furü ', this argument needs to be demonstrated, not merely posited, in each and every area of speciality within the furü '. "^ As it is the case with other areas of the law, the positive stipulations pertaining to kitàb alqàdi ilà al-qàdi are explicated in adab al-qàdi works, while the formularies used by the qàdis in this practice are delineated in shurüt manuals. At times, both elements are elaborated in one and medieval society that inhabited far-flung territories and was geographically mobile. A debt owed to a person in a remote town or village might not be paid by the debtor without resorting to the long arm of the court. Similarly, this instrument could mediate the return to the master of a slave who ran away to an outlying village. The use of this instrument, in effect, brought together what is otherwise dispersed and independent jurisdictional units into a single, interconnected juridical system. Without such a legal device, one jurist correctly observed, rights would be lost and justice would remain suspended.^
The very need for this particular legal device since the early period^ became the mainstay of its own justification as a valid and an integral part of the law. As a matter of strict principle, however, the kitàb al-qàdi ilà al-qàdi would be rather unjustifiable on the grounds that the handwriting and the qàdi's seal are at worst liable to outright forgery and distortion, and at best may not be easily distinguishable from other, similar handwritten instruments or seals.'^ This rooted suspicion of written instruments in general has for long been a wellknown characteristic of Islamic law. In fact, the suspicion cast upon kitàb alqàdï in particular was sufficient to convince the Ja'farite jurists of its categorical illegality. ^^ But as a matter of practice, the Sunnite jurists could not afford to dispense with it.^^ The dire need for it compelled them to recognize this instrument to be as valid as any other evidential medium, and, as we shall see, the Màlikites even allowed for certain liberties in excess of what was already admitted by the other schools.
Evidence of the necessity and common use of this instrument is both obvious and abundant. All legal manuals offum' and adab al-qàdï include a chapter devoted to kitàb al-qàdï ilà al-qàdï, and the great majority of the authors of these works do state that despite the uncertainties involved in such a practice it is permitted due to its being utterly indispensable.^^ The literature is ^ Ibn al-Munàsif, Tanbih al-Hukkam, 152-153; Baghdàdî, Ma'üna, III, 1511 . See also sources cited in the previous note.
^ The earliest evidence of using this type of written communication belongs to the second/eighth century. See Abu 'Umar Muhammad b. Yüsuf al-Kindî, Akhbàr Qudàt Misr, éd. Rhuvon Guest (repr., Cairo: al-Fàrûq al-Hadîtha lil-Tibà'a wal-Nashr, n.d.), [407] [408] [409] [410] Muhammad b. Khalaf Wakf, n.d.) , I, 265; II, 11, Í2, 22, 49-50, 67, 119, 416, md passim. ^0 SaraMisî, Mabsût, XV, 95; al-Fatàwâ al-Hindiyya, III, 381. ^' Abu Ja'far Muhanmiad b. al-Hasan al-Tûsï, al-Khilàffi al-Fiqh, 2 vols. (Tehran: Matba'at Tàbân, 1382 /1962 , II, 595. How the Shî'ite jurists substituted this legal practice by another (if at all), would make for an interesting enquiry.
12 Even in the modem period. See n. 21, below. '^ See, among many other sources, Ibn Qudama, Mughni, XI, 458; idem, Kàfi, IV, 302; Sarakhsï, Mabsüt, XV, 95; Simnànï, I, 330; also peppered with multiple references to general and particular practices connected with this mode of writing. Ozajandi speaks of the manner in which kitàb al-qàdï is addressed in his own time and locale.*"^ Kurdari mentions the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon kitàb al-qàdï and argues that the practice of his day imposes no such limitations. On the authority of the Hanafite jurist Asbîjàbï, he claims that this liberal doctrine is the standard, authoritative position of the school ('alayhi al-fatwà)P Ibn Abi al-Damm states that the chapter he allocates for this topic reflects the practices of his region.*^ Wanshañsi, citing the Málikite Ibn 'Abd al-Salam, Ibn 'Arafa, Ibn alMunasif and others, attests to the fact that the practice has been widespread since early times in Málikite domains.^^ By far the most extensive evidence comes from the qàdfs diwàn, mistermed «court sijills»}^ Our evidence shows that this type of written instrument was regularly recorded in the judicial diwàns, and that when the dïwàn was transferred -~™-by means of copying-from the outgoing to the incoming qàdi, the kitàbs constituted one of the major items to be copied. ^^ Hindiyya, III, 381; Ibn al-Humam, Sharh Path al-Qadir, VII, 286; Muhammad b. Muhammad Ibn Shiháb Ibn Bazzáz al-Kurdarï, al-Fatàwà al-Bazzàziyya (or al-Jàmi' al-Wajíz), printed with al-Faîàwà al-Hindiyya, vols. 4-6 (repr., Beirut: Dar Ihyà' al-Turàth al-'Arabî, 1400 /1980 , V, 183. See also n. 7, above.
The justification of kitàb al-qàdi on the basis of Quranic and Sunnaic evidence is rather thin, a fact providing ample proof that the kitàb became part of the law because it proved essential to legal operation. On textual evidence, see Ahmad b. 'All b. Hajar al-'Asqalànï, Fath al-Bàri biSharh Satfih al-Bukhàri, 13 vols. (Beirut: Dâr al-Ma'rifa, 1980) , XIII, [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] [145] ''* See Fakhr al-Dm Hasan b. Mansûr al-Ozajandî, Fatàwà Qàdîkhàn, printed with al-Fatàwà al-Hindiyya, vols. 1-3 (repr., Beirut: Dar Ihyà' al-Turâth al-'Arabî, 1400/1980), II, 487. '^ Kurdarï, al-Fatàwà al-Bazzàziyya, V, 183. '^ Adab al-Qadà', 353 in conjunction with pp. 174 and 365. '^ Wansharîsî, al-Mi'yàr, X, 60-76, especially 60, 61 . For other references to practice, see also Bàjï, Fusül al-Ahkàm, 267, 271; Qàdî 'lyâd (and his son Muhammad), Madhàhib alHukkàmfi Nawàzil al-Ahkàm, éd. M. b. Sharîfa (Beirut: Dâr al-Gharb al-Islàmî, 1990), 34; Ibn Hajar al-Haytamï, al-Fatàwà al-Kubrà al-Fiqhiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: 'Abd al-Hamîd Ahmad alHanafî, 1938) Thus, the pervasiveness of the practice has called upon formal sanctioning: Muwaffaq al-Dm Ibn Qudama and Ibn al-Munasif, among numerous others, go as far as to argue that the universal need for, and use of, this instrument generated nothing short of a consensus (ijmà ') upon its validity, both as a legal entity and as a practice.^^ There is no doubt then that kitàb al-qàdï was a common practice in the Sunnite legal system,^ ^ and that in at least its broad outlines no gap between doctrine and the reality of practice can be posited. A fairly detailed picture of the workings of this device can be gleaned from a careful study of adab al-qàdï works. Yet, a systematic and complete study would be possible only by adding to our repertoire of sources the actual kitabs that the Muslim judges wrote to each other in a particular period and region concerning a variety of matters. Only then will we be able to understand the precise nature of these written instruments, how they functioned in the legal system of a particular region, and to what extent, if any, the practice of written communication diverged from the prescriptions of model legal works authored by legists living and working in the same region. But such a comparative project would have to await the discovery of this material. For now, we must be content to look at how the practice of kitàb al-qàdï ilà al-qàdï was appropriated and prescribed by the law. But this is not all. In the course of this article, it will become obvious that our model works contain enough references to the realia of practice as to give us a valuable picture of the law, its workings, and, most significantly, the modificatory effect of practice upon legal doctrine.
sijill by means of a qàdi's kitàb. Similarly, kitabs were recorded even in twentieth-century court records, for which see n. 21, below. An early account of Kindï suggests that the kitabs were recorded as a matter of course. Akhbàr Qudàt Misr, 410. See also Hallaq, Mughni, XI, 458; XI, 467; 156; Nizam, III, 381; Vn, [285] [286] ^' The practice, furthermore, survives in twentieth-century law, even in those areas which are heavily affected by tribal customary law. In a court record dating from 1951, from the Libyan town Jdàbiyya, a man from the tribe of Shaykhî asked the qàdi Muhammad b. Jaziyya to record in his favour the testimony of witnesses to the effect that due to a car accident his son's leg has become dysfunctional. He needed a written record of this testimony because he could not take his son with him to Bengazi, where he launched a suit against the car's driver who, apparently, happened They represent a more or less synchronic view of two regions that differ in more than one way, not the least of which are differences in social, economic and legal terms.
There is more to these two model manuals than meets the eye. As I said earlier, they are, like many other model works, replete with important references to the mundane operation of the law.^^ Ibn Abî al-Danmi's treatise is intended, by his own admission, to discuss rules governing, among other things, the judge's rights and duties, legal disputes, lawsuits, and procedural and documentary evidence «current among the legists of this age.»^"^ The last part of the work comprises numerous sections devoted to formularies «according to the conventions prevalent in our regions and age.»^^ In yet another section, he treats some 69 major cases pertaining to sales, property, liability, rent, preemption, waqf, marriage and divorce, cases which he describes as being authoritative (madhhabiyya) and of frequent occurrence (kathirat al-tadawul) in courts of law.^^ On the whole then his book is intended to be of «benefit to the judges... 37, 41, 62, 92, 108, 123, 139, 203, 211, 212, 220, 222, 232, 278, 300, 308, 310, 336, 347, 353, 365, 371, 372, 378, 419, 428 (three references), 430 (twice), [435] [436] [437] [438] 454, 455, 457, 463, 480, 489, 550 and passim; 59, 62, [108] [109] [135] [136] 137, [139] [140] 142, 144, 145, 156, 160, 169, 17Í, 174, 181, 184, 187, 201, 204, 325, 330, 332, 334, 336, 337, 14. 25 Ibid, 15, 353, 365. 26 Ibid, In addition to the multiple references he makes to practice, he clearly states that his book was intended to be short {mukhtasarf^ containing, as it is, only that subject matter which the judges «need nowadays and on which hinge the affairs of judgeship.»^^ Like Ibn Abï al-Damm, he too makes explicit reference to the doctrine of kitàb alqàdi in relation to the practice of his time and place. He not only comments on the actual practice in this area of the law, but when he comes to prescribe the formulas and contents that the qàdis must use in their written communications, he in effect describes the practice. (The careful reader cannot but have a strong sense that the discourse of both authors on doctrine intermeshes with, and provides a formal veneer for, the ever pervasive discourse of practice). The very title Ibn al-Munásif gives to the section relevant to us speaks for itself: «Concerning the Forms of Writing Used Nowadays Among the Qàdis.»^^ The value of Ibn al-Munàsif's work for the legal historian must be further appreciated due to the fact that the author considers one of his chief tasks the critique of those practices that are in discord with the law, be they outright legal errors or unwarranted leniency in applying the law.^^ In sum, then, the two works constitute important sources for the study of doctrine and practice relative to kitàb al-qàdi at the turn of the 7th/13th century, in Syria, Andalusia and the Maghreb. That they also reflect the modificatory effect of practice upon legal doctrine shall also become obvious in due course. The entire field of discourse is organized in terms of the status of the parties involved and the res or debt on account of which they became parties to the litigation or dispute. This organization of the subject produces four possible situations: (1) both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, together with the res in dispute are present within the jurisdiction of the presiding qàdï; (2) both parties are present, but the res is not; (3) the plaintiff is present but the defendant and the res are not; and (4) the plaintiff and the res are present but the defendant is not. Now, only, the last three of these possibilities give the qàdï cause to resort to writing to another qàdi, for when the litigants are present before the qàdï, and the res, whatever it may be, is to be found in the same locale, there would be no justification for such written communication: The qàdï himself hears the case, and his decision would be enforced under his direct supervision and within his jurisdiction.^^ If both parties are present but the res exists in another locale, the qàdi, having found in favour of the plaintiff, writes to the qàdï of that locale in order that he, the receiving qàdi, carry out the judgment. If the right of the plaintiff's ownership is established by the confession (iqràr) of the defendant, then the qàdï need not necessarily explain the evidence of his judgment. The reason for this is that confession supersedes any evidence that may have been produced by the defendant. If, however, the plaintiff takes an oath to the effect that the res belongs to him, and the defendant refuses (nukül) to take an oath to the contrary, namely, that the res belongs to him not to the plaintiff, then the qàdï must stipulate in his kitàb the fact of the defendant's nuW. For if the latter were to produce evidence of his right to ownership, then the evidence may override his refusal to take the oath.^"* The plaintiff may be able to estabHsh his ownership of the res by means of testimonial evidence, in which case the Shafi'ites hold two views as to whether the qàdï must or must not specify the evidential (=testimonial) means by which 343 ff. ^^ Ibid., 344; Màwardï, 11, 102 , where the rationale for the need to write in the case of nukül, in contradistinction with confession (iqràr), is explained. he found in favour of the plaintiff. Those jurists who insisted that in his kitàb the qàdi should make such a specification held this view on the grounds that the defendant may produce his own witnesses, in which case he, not the plaintiff, becomes entitled to the ownership of the res. The right of the defendant here rests on the doctrine that when the two testimonial pieces of evidence produced by the two parties are of equal weight, the party in possession (yad) of the res acquires the right of proprietorship. However, certain jurists held that if the qadi does proffer an explanation of the testimonial evidence on which his decision is based, he must also specify that he had established the rectitude ( 'adàla) of the witnesses.^^ Other jurists held that he need not make such a specification in his kitàb, for it is implied that if he had admitted their testimony, their rectitude would not, at his court, be subject to impeachment.^^ But the defendant and the res may both be found in a remote locale, outside the jurisdiction of the qàdi where the plaintiff resides. If the res is immovable property, then the only type of evidence admissible against the defendant is the testimony of witnesses. Having established the rectitude of witnesses, the presiding qàdi (i.e., the qàdi before whom the plaintiff brought his claim) may write to this effect to the qàdi where the property is found, irrespective of where the defendant may be at the time of litigation or of writing (allowing that he may be in a yet third locale). However, procuring witnesses may not be as simple as calling upon them to attend the court of the plaintiff's qàdi. In fact, this qàdi does not hear their testimony if they reside in the locale where the property is found, for, as a matter of strict procedure, they should be examined by, and submit their testimony to, the qadi of their own locale, where the disputed property exists. But if they no longer reside in the locale where the property is found, and do not intend to return, the plaintiff's qàdi is under the obligation to write to the qadi where the property is found to the effect that they attested before him in favour of the plaintiff and that he, the addressee, must establish their rectitude. Handing the responsibility to examine the witnesses and establish their rectitude to the receiving qàdi is occasioned by the fact that they would be known to the people of that locality where they used to live but 344; Màwardï, [102] [103] 34 , makes the significant statement that some Malikite judges did not insist on the requirement of the witnesses' rectitude on the grounds of necessity, and that the court system has operated, presumably during and before his time, under this concession. http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es unknown in the locality to which they have recently moved. In this case, the plaintiff's qàdi would confine his function to hearing and registering the testimony, whereas the receiving qadi would both establish the testimonial evidence and decide in the case.
The witnesses before the qàdi may be residents of a third locale, that is, one which is neither that of the defendant nor that in which the property is found. In this case, three qàdis would be involved. The qàdi in the defendants' locale may hear the witnesses' testimony and may write to the qàdi in their original locale with a view that the latter may establish their rectitude. Once their rectitude is established, the latter shall write back to the former to this effect. Having received this written communication, the qàdi in the defendant's locale decides on the case and communicates his decision in writing to the qàdi where the property is found. The latter implements the decision in accordance with the former's kitàb?'^ If the res is a movable property (such as a horse or a slave) that possesses particular qualities which can distinguish it from other similar qualities, then the qàdi hears the testimony of witnesses, and writes what is in effect an open letter (kitàb) addressed to the qàdi of the locale in which the property is found, wherever that locale may be.^^ This doctrine, as held by Ibn Abî al-Damm, seems to be at variance with that espoused by Màwardî some two centuries earlier. The latter argues that there are two doctrines (qawlàn) with regard to a plaintiff who, at a court of law, claims the right to a movable property which is in the possession of an absente reo. In his view, the less acceptable of the two doctrines is that already mentioned by Ibn Abî al-Damm. Màwardî maintains that the authoritative doctrine of the Shafi'ites -a doctrine which, he stresses, has been put into normative practice {ma 'mül 'alayh)-is that the qàdi shall not decide on the right of ownership of movable property unless the property is physically present before the witnesses when they render their testimony. For allowing a testimony with regard to an absent property raises the probability of error significantly because the property may be confused with another similar to it.^^ Finally, Ibn Abî al-Damm discusses the possibility of a plaintiff who claims the right of ownership of a local property in the absence of the defendant. Since ', 346; 173) argues that whoever receives the kitàb, whether he is the qàdi addressed therein or not, must admit the validity of the kitàb's legal effect and must act in accord with it (provided, of course, that the kitàb itself has met all legal requirements). The point here is that the kitàb's vaHdity is independent of who and where the receiving qàdi is. Cf. Simnànî, Rawdat al-Qudàt, I, 332-333, for the Hanafite position.
39 Màwardî, Adab al-Qàdi, II, 107. the property (even if movable) is present within the jurisdiction of the qàdi before whom the plaintiff is making his claim, the qàdi hears the evidence and renders a judgment -unless the qàdi does not subscribe to the doctrine that a court can reach a decision against an absente reo^^ This point marks the end of Ibn Abî al-Damm's indebtedness to Mâwardï, although a cursory comparison shows that the former was highly selective in appropriating the latter's discourse. At least in one important instance, we have seen that Ibn Abi al-Damm opted for a view considered weak by Mâwardï, and, at the same time, ignored what Mâwardï deemed an authoritative opinion constituting the foundation of practice (ma'mül 'alayh) in his own time. Needless to say, this selective appropriation is emblematic of the creative recreation and reenactment of legal doctrine within the authoritative structures of the school (madhhab). To say that Màwardï's discourse here is used more as a mantle of authority than a real source of substantive legal doctrine is not only to state the obvious, but also to describe a common practice.
Màwardï's classification proved useful in terms of the physical presence or absence of the three constitutive elements involved in kitàb al-qàdi ilà al-qàdi, namely, the plaintiff, the defendant and the object of dispute. From a different angle, however, the kitàb may be regulated in terms of legal contents: that is, it may contain testimonial evidence, the estabhshing of a right, or the rendering of a judgment."^* In the case of conveying only testimonial evidence (due to the hardship involved in transporting the witnesses), the qàdi details the names high howsoever, nicknames and lineages of the litigants, and specifies who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant in the case."*^ He also describes in detail the object of litigation, as well as the date of this court proceeding. Then he must mention the names high howsoever, nicknames and lineages of the witnesses, and whether or not he deems them just ( 'udül) . If he records their testimony without having investigated their rectitude, he should write to this effect, so the "^ Ibid., II, 114; Ibn Abî al-Damm, Adab al-Qadà', 346. Contrary to the Shafi'ites, the Hanafites generally do not allow the qàdi to decide on a case in which one of the parties, usually the defendant or his/her agent, is absent: Simnânî, Rawdat al-Qudàt, I, 190. For the Màlikites, geographical distance determines the question: if the defendant is required to travel up to several days, then he should be summoned. The qadi may decide on the case in his absence only if he or his agent {wakil) fail to appear before the court. If the distance is more than ten days of travel, then the qàdi may decide on the case without due notice to the defendant. For more details, see Kinànï, II, 204 qàdi in receipt of his communication will undertake such an investigation. At times, the kitàb contains the testimony of a sole witness, since the other witness may be found in the locale in which the qàdi in receipt of the communication is presiding. In some pecuniary matters, one witness and the plaintiff's oath suffice. In such cases, the qàdi in receipt of the kitàb containing the testimony of a single witness shall ask the plaintiff who is in his presence to take an oath. At this point, Ibn Abî al-Damm says that in these matters the judges are in the practice of composing their kitàbs in a variety of ways, and that in a later section dedicated to formularies he will expound those which he prefers."^^ The kitàb may contain only the establishment of a right (thubüt haqq). The qàdi must address it either to a specific qàdi or leave it open, with the formula: «This is my kitàb to whoever receives it among the qàdis of Muslims» (hàdhà kitàbï iïà man yasilu ilayhi min qudati al-muslimin). Then follows the reason for which it is being written: «The reason for issuing is that such and such right has been established before me by means of the testimony of so and so (here he mentions the full names of witnesses, their nicknames, etc.) who are of just character». Then he mentions that this procedure has been initiated in the wake of a claim made by so and so (here he records the plaintiff's full name, nickname, etc.) against so and so (again with his or her full name, etc.). Finally, the qàdi should mention the right claimed and established and the date of the proceeding. Since rendering a judgment is an immediate step after the establishment of right, the qàdi may, upon the request of the plaintiff, give his judgment. If he does so, he should clearly mention it in his written communication."^ Some jurists, particularly the Hanafites, do not differentiate between the establishment of a right and the rendering of a judgment {hukm). They argued that once a right has been established by way of valid and complete courtroom evidence, the very mention by the qàdi of the establishment of this right constitutes nothing short of a judgment."^^ Ibn Abî al-Damm does not suscribe to ^^ Ibn Abî al-Damm, Adah al-Qadà ', 346-347; «wa-lil-hukkàmifi wad'i hàdhihi al-mukàtabàti rusümun mutanawwVatun, wa-nahnu nadhkuru ma huwa al-mukhtàra 'indanñfí bàbi al-shurïiti wal-mukàtabàti al-hukmiyya» (p. 247, 11. 7-9) .
^ Ibid., 347. ^^ Taqî al-Dïn al-Subkî makes the remark that the Shàfi'ites and the Málikites generally consider the thubüt and the hukm to be two different categories, whereas the Hanafites deem them one and the same thing. Further on this, and on the differences between thubüt and hukm according to the distinguished eastern Màhkite jurist Shihib al-Dîn al-Qaràfî, see Wansharïsî, X, [73] [74] [75] [76] this doctrine, and deems the establishment of a right a prior and necessary step leading to, but distinct from, judgment."*^ This juristic disagreement has fundamental implications as to whether the kitàb can be dismissed by the receiving qàdi. One of the requirements for the validity of the qàdi's kitàb is the hardship involved in bringing the witnesses, the defendant or the disputed object before the presiding judge. Here, considerations of geographical distance become important. It seems that the majority of jurists held that if the kitàb containing the conveyance of testimony or the establishment of a right is sent to a nearby locality, then the receiving qàd has the right to dismiss it if the witnesses are deemed able to travel to the court of the qàdi presiding over the case. But he cannot dismiss the kitàb if it contains a judgment, for a judgment is irrevocable and has an impeachable sanctity."^^ The problematic that arises here is that if a judge -who considers the establishment of a right to be tantamount to a judgment-sends to another, who does not subscribe to this doctrine, a kitàb containing the establishment of a right, is the latter judge under the obligation to accept the legal effects of the kitàb or not? The jurists seem to have disagreed, some answering in the negative, others in the affirmative. The conveyance in the kitàb of a judgment, as opposed to an establishment of a right, has another ramification in the context of cases subject to juristic disagreement (khilàfiyyàt). It is universally held that the receiving qàdi must accept and implement the legal effects of the written communication if it contains a judgment, for judgments possess a finalistic force."^^ Refusing to accept and implement a judgment amounts to judicial revocation, and this is normatively inadmissible in Islamic law."^^ But the receiving qàdi may dismiss a written communication that contains anything other than a judgment if he disagrees with the issuing qàdi with regard to the law being appHed to the case under consideration.^^ Now, in a case where a judgment is conveyed in writing against an absente reo, the qàdi must do everything he can to identify the defendant, including the recording of his name high howsoever, specifying any distinguishing physical qualities {hull, pi. of hilya),^^ and stating the exact location of his residence. Clearly, the purpose behind all this is that the defendant must be identified in such a way as to preclude the possibility of confusing him with another person. For if the defendant's name, nickname, and physical qualities are not fully recorded, and if he acknowledges to be the person intended in the document but denies the plaintiff's claim, the qàdi is under the obligation to dismiss the case provided that the defendant takes the oath. The dismissal of the case would then be justified on the technical grounds that the identity of the defendant is vaguely described in the kitàbP If any part of the defendant's name appearing in the kitàb does not correspond to the name of the person summoned before the receiving qàdi, the latter is dismissed provided that he takes an oath to the effect that he gave the qàdi his correct name. Then the onus of proof rests with the plaintiff who must now establish -if he can-that that person is himself the defendant mentioned in the document. But if the alleged defendant acknowledges that his name is identical to that recorded in the kitàb but denies any relationship or dispute with the plaintiff, then he, the alleged defendant, must prove that he is not the defendant, by showing, for instance, that another person in his village or town carries the same name. If the namesake has died after the writing of the kitàb, then homonymity is confirmed and the receiving qàdi must establish that the dead person is indeed the defendant. But there is disagreement among the jurists as to whether homonymity is further investigated if the namesake dies before the writing. Some jurists held the doctrine that the qàdi must investigate the identity of the namesake all the same, while others rejected this doctrine.^^
The qàdi may himself write the kitàb or he may have his scribe undertake this task. If his scribe writes it, the qàdi should, with his own hand, write between the lines (in a space intentionally left by the scribe) that he has ordered the issuance of the communication to qàdi so and so (if it is not an open letter); that it was set by his own seal; and that the proceedings recorded have truly taken place at his courtroom. Then he should request the receiving qàdi to implement the legal effects of the kitàb according to the dictates of the shar\ Finally, he should date it.^"^ If he himself writes the kitàb, he ought (1) to place his insignia^^ at the top right of the kitàb (as well as over the ends of the sheets where additional documents have been glued); (2) to write in the opening part and at the back of the kitàb his own name and the name of the qàdi to whom it is addressed; (3) to set his seal; and (4) to read the contents of the kitàb in the presence of two witnesses who are to convey the document to the other qadi. They should attest to the fact that they know him; that the contents of the communication are true; that the kitàb is his; that the proceedings he has recorded have indeed taken place at his courtroom; and that the seal is his.^^ The Sháfi'ites insist that the legitimacy of the kitàb rests upon the two witnesses who attest to the authenticity of the document. Without them the document has no value, but without the document their testimony remains valid. An indication of the value of testimonial evidence lies in the very acceptance of the kitàb even if it has been damaged or its writing has been wholly or in part erased.^^ Generally speaking, this is the position of all the schools, to the exception of the later Malikites (whom we shall discuss later). Malik even went further and held the doctrine that in cases involving fornication there must be four witnesses who attest to the qàdfs writing of the kitàb, just as the law requires four witnesses to prove the occurrence of an act of fornication. But this doctrine remained highly controversial.^^
The witnesses perform a double function of what may be called receiving and imparting testimony. The first function is tahammul al-shahàda, literally, carrying over the testimony. In the Shàfi'ite school, but not in the Malikite, it requires the qàdi, or failing that an official of the court, to read the kitàb in the presence of the witnesses. The qàdi then acknowledges its contents, and confirms the establishment of the right (thubut al-haqq) and the judgment rendered. For their attestation to be valid, the Sháfi'ites take it for granted that the witnesses' rectitude should be known to both qàdm, although many Málikite judges do not seem to have insisted on this requirement.^^ At the courtroom of the receiving qàdi they should declare that «qàdi so and so, whom should not change his 'alàma unless it is absolutely necessary, and if he does, the change should take place between posts, never during tenure. On this and on Egyptian and Syrian practices concerning this matter around the ninth/fifteenth century, see http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es I know, had me testify on such and such day at his courtromm (majlis) in the city of Baghdad that this (the witness pointing to the document) is his kitàb, set by his seal, and its contents are such and such.»^° The Màlikites and the Shàfi'ites -unlike the Hanafites-allow written communication in all matters of the law, including discretionary and Quranic punishments.^^ In any area of the law, the communication may be dealing with the mere conveyance of a testimony, of the establishment of a right or of a judgment. The communication may be addressed to a certain qadi, but it may also be an open communication. Although addressed to a certain qàdi, it is incumbent upon any other qàdi who deems the kitàb valid to act upon it if the qàdi originally designated in the kitàb was dismissed or has died.^^ Similarly, the status of the kitàb is in no way affected by the dismissal or death of the qàdi who wrote it. As long as the kitàb is written and sealed before the change in the qàdfs status takes effect, it remains valid and binding, whether it is sent out immediately or after his dismissal or death.^^ The issue of the kitàb's validity upon death or dismissal becomes somewhat more complicated in the case of judges writing to their deputies (sing., khalifa or nà'ib). For there are two conflicting doctrines which dominated the Islamic legal scene with regard to whether the deputy's status and appointment are wholly contingent upon those of the judge who appointed him. The question that became emblematic of this debate is whether the deputy would automatically be dismissed upon the dismissal or death of the appointing judge. Those who held that the deputy would be dismissed, argued that the kitàb's legal effect, the hukm, becomes null and void. Ibn Abî al-Damm, upholding what he declares to be an authoritative (sahih) doctrine,^ asserts that the hukm remains valid and binding, on the grounds that the deputy judge continues to hold the office after the death or dismissal of the appointing judge.^^ That written communications addressed by the qadi to his deputies and vice versa are admissible by the law is not subject to dispute.^^ But are the deputies' communications to each other admissible, and can they receive such communications from qadis presiding over jurisdictions other than those of the appointing judge? Ibn al-Munasif answers that the deputys' jurisdiction is determined by the appointing judge, so that if he assigns them the power to write to each other or receive written instruments from other judges, then they may operate within the terms of their appointment.^*^ But the principle of delegation here does not apply to the qadis vis-à-vis the ruler.^^ Whether the ruler stipulates -'in his decree of judicial appointment Cahd or taqlidf^-his permission to the qadis to write to each other or omits any mention of such matters, the qadis continue to enjoy this function as part of their jurisdiction.'^^
IV
The forgoing outline of the law regulating the procedures and modalities involved in kitâb al-qàdi ilà aUqàdi suffices to show that one of the central conditions for the validity of such written instruments is the presence of two witnesses who will testify to the documentary transfer from one qàdi to another. ^"^ The change appears with all likelihood to have taken place both in the eastern and western parts of the Muslim world. Our evidence for the west will be discussed below. For the east, see the royal decrees of judicial appointment in Qalqashandî, XI, 192, 201, and n. 79, below . But Qalqashandfs evidence belongs to a period after the 660s/1260s, when under the Mamlûks a Chief Justice was appointed to each of the four schools.
^^ The attestation of handwriting was also admissible in two other spheres of the law: The attestation of handwriting of a witness who died or who cannot be present at court, and the attestation of the handwriting of a muqirr, one who acknowledges that he/she owes a right to someone else. Both of these types are deemed admissible by the great majority of Malikite jurists: Ibn al-Munasif, Tanbih al-Hukkàm, 160. For a detailed account of the law pertaining to al-shahàda see Ibn Farhûn, I, The Zàhirites also admitted the kitàb on the basis of attestation to handwriting. In fact, they seem to have been the most lenient of the schoools on a great number of crucial matters. For example, witnesses were not required, and if they do come to play a role, their rectitude is not a necessary condition for the validity of the kitàb. See Ibn al-Munasif, Tanbih al-Hukkàm, 153, for a summary of the Zàhirite doctrine. Ibn Hazm, however, discusses these issues neither in his It is highly probable that the practice initially started in eastern Andalusia, and was to spread later to the west and the African south^^ The earlier Zahirite acceptance of this doctrine and practice may represent the forerunner of this Màlikite development.^^ Ibn Sahl, who died in 486/1093, reports that the Eastern Andalusian qàdis were not only satisfied with handwriting and the seal, but accepted the kitàb as true and authentic even if the qàdi wrote nothing in it but the 'unwàn, a short statement that includes the names of the sending and receiving qàdisJ^ Although this was never the case before, it has become the standard doctrine, acknowledged to be a distinctly Màlikite entity by the other schools as well as by the ruling political power.''^ The early Màlikite scholars considered a qàdi's kitàb invalid if its authentication depended solely on the identification of handwriting.^^ Mutarrif and Ibn al-''^ For North Africa, particularly Tunis, see Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's and Ibn Ràshid's weighty statements in Wansharîsî, al-Mi'yâr al-Mu'rib, X, 61-62. This Ibn 'Abd al-Salim, who was a Màlikite, is not to be conftised with the Shifi'ite namesake, a highly distinguished jurist who flourished in the east.
^' See n. 75, above, for the Zahirite doctrine. I am indebted to Maribel Fierro for suggesting this link.
"^^ Ibn Sahl's comment on the evidence of handwriting is cited in Wansharîsî, al-Mi'yàr alMu'rib, X, 61. The Màlikite Ibn 'Abd al-Salàm, as quoted by Wansharîsî {ibid., X, 62), reveals something about the origins of the doctrine which admits the practice of authenticating the kitab through handwriting. He argues that this later doctrine and practice utterly deviate from the authoritative doctrines of the school's founding fathers, and was based on a faulty interpretation of the practice of Sahnün and Ibn Kinána, who used, on some occasions, to accept the written instruments of persons whom they knew intimately, and in whom they placed their personal trust and confidence. This exceptional and provisional practice, Ibn 'Abd al-Salàm says, was taken by later generations of judges and jurists to constitute a general principle (as/), on the basis of which an entire doctrine has come to be constructed. It is in this sense that we should understand the statement of Ibn Hishàm al-Qurtubï (d. 606/1209), who attributed a similar doctrine to Ibn alMàjishûn and Mutarrif. In his Mufid al-Hukkàm, he argued that in certain (but by no means all) cases a qàdi should admit the validity of another qàd's kitab if he, the former, was certain {lam yashikk) that the written communication was undoubtedly that of the latter. See Carmona González, A., «La correspondencia oficial entre jueces en el Mufid de Ibn Hishàm de Córdoba», in Homenaje al Prof. Jacinto Bosch Vilá, I (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1991), 505-506. Similarly, see Arcas Campoy, M., «La correspondencia de los cadíes en el Muntajab al-Ahkàm de Ibn Abí Zamamn», Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E. A.I. {Málaga, 1984) Májishün rejected the authenticity of a kitàb even though two witnesses may testify that they have seen the issuing qàdi write with his own hand.^* They insisted, as did all the other jurists, that the witnesses attest to the matter by declaring that the issuing qàdi, whom they know, had them testify on a certain day at his courtroom (majlis) in a particular city or village, that this (the witnesses pointing to the document) is his kitàb; and that it is set by his seal. At this point, the witnesses would be required to reiterate the contents of the document. Nothing short of this testimony would suffice. Writing around 600 A. H. (ca. 1200 A. D.), Ibn al-Munàsif portrays a vivid picture of the change in Morocco and Andalusia:
In the regions with which we are in contact, the people [viz. jurists] of our age have nowadays agreed to permit the kitàbs of qads in matters of judgments and rights on the basis of sheer knowledge of the qàdi's handwriting without his attestation to it, and without a recognized seal. They have demonstrably acquiesced in permitting and practicing this [matter] . I do not think there is anyone who can tum them away from it, because it [the practice] has become widespread in all the regions, and because they have colluded to accept and assert it.^^ That the change took place during the decades preceding Ibn al-Munásif's time may be inferred not only from his reaction to it as a novelty but also from the urgency with which he felt the need to justify the new practice. «We have established that Malik's school, as do other schools, deems the qàdis' kitàbs which have been attested by witnesses lawful, and that these [instruments] were considered inadmissible by the sheer evidence of handwriting.» Yet, Ibn alMunàsif continues, «people and all judges [of our times and regions] are in full agreement as to their permissibility, bindingness and putative authority; therefore we need to investigate the matter...» by means of «finding out a good way to make this [issue] rest on a sound method and clear foundations to which one can refer and on the basis of which the rules of Shan*a may be derived.»^^ 155, ^^ Ibid., . With a minor variation in the opening line, this revealing statement was cited as an authoritative attestation to the practice by Wansharîsî, X, 62, [164] [165] in conjunction with p. 156, both passages having the same theme: «wa-idhà qarramà min madhhabi MMikin wa-ghayrihi jawàza kutubi alqu(&ti bil-ishhàdi 'alayhà wa-man 'a al-qabuli bi-mujarradi ma 'rifati al-khatti, wa-anna al-nàsa Accordingly, the new practice is justified on the basis of darüra (necessity), a principle much invoked to explain and rationalize otherwise inadmissible but needed legal practices and concepts, including, interestingly enough, the very concept and practice of kitàb al-qàdi ilâ al-qàdi. The principle of darüra finds justification in Quran II: 185: «God wants things to be easy for you and does not want any hardship for you.»^"* Ibn al-Munàsif argues that it is often difficult to find two witnesses who can travel from one town to another, probably quite remote, in order to attest to the authenticity of the conveyed document. Attesting to handwriting thus became the solution to this problem. For without this solution, Ibn al-Munàsif avered, either justice would be thwarted or the witnesses would have to endure the hardship of travel; and both results would be objectionable. Furthermore, since the ultimate goal is to prove the authenticity of the qàdi's kitàbs against forgery and distortion, any means which achieves this end must be considered legitimate. If, therefore, the receiving qàdi can establish beyond a shade of doubt that the document under consideration -written by the hand of the sending qàdi and set by his sealtruly belongs to the qàdi who claims to have sent it to him, then the document possesses an authenticating power equal to, if not better than (dàhà), another document that has been attested and conveyed by two just witnesses.^^ From all this two distinct features emerge in the context of the attestation to handwriting. First, the pervasive practice on the popular and professional legal levels -as vividly described by Ibn al-Munásif-appears to amount to a socio-legal consensus. The practice is so entrenched that any notion of reversing it would seem utterly infeasible. True, this sort of consensus does not possess the backing of the traditional mechanisms of law, but its putative force -in its own locale and context-is nonetheless equal to that of traditional ijrnà'. Second, the justification of the practice squarely rests on the principle of necessity, sanctioned as a means by which undue hardship and harm are al-yawma wa-kàffata al-hukkâmi mutamâluna 'ala ijàzati dhâlika wa-iltizàrnihi wal-'amali bi-hi fa-là budda an nuhaqqiqafi dhâlika» (164-165); «wa-lâ budda... min al-tanqibi wal-talattufi fi isnàdi dhâlika ilà wajhin sahîhin wa-aslin wàdihin yasluhu al-masîru ilayhi . The first part of this statement was cited, with minor variations, by Wanshaiîsî, X, 64. ^ The textual justification of attesting to handwriting operates on two levels, one direct, the other oblique. The Quranic verse (11, 185) is indirect in the sense that it occasions a principle, darüra, by which the practice is in turn justified. But Ibn al-Munasif {Tanbih al-Hukkam, 165) also resorts to Prophetic Sira to validate the practice directly on textual basis, citing the Prophet's letters to the Byzantine Emperor Hiraql (Heraclius) and the Sassanid Kisrâ (Khusru Parviz). See also 'Asqalânï, XHI, [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] [145] 165 . http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es averted. Now, what is most interesting about these two features is that they both also played a most central role in injecting kitàb aUqàdi ilà al-qàdi into the realm of formal legal discourse. Consensus was emblematic of its extensive existence in the world of practice, and the principle of necessity was instrumental in bringing it to the realm of formal legitimacy. Finally, Ibn al-Munàsif discusses some of the rules governing the attestation to handwriting. It is obvious that once the receiving qàdi identifies the handwriting in the document as being truly that of the sending qadi, then he can act upon its legal effects, and need not be assisted by witnesses. If he cannot identify the handwriting, he must procure two just witnesses who can. They should be experts in handwritten documents and knowledgeable of the handwriting of the qàdi in question. Once the qàdi verifies, independently or through expert witnesses, the authenticity of the document, he should implement its effects. Failing that, he should register in his record (sijill) that he deems the document authentic on account of the handwriting, and he should have his declaration attested by witnesses. Immediate registration and attestation of the document's validity is required in case one or both of the qàdis, the sending or the receiving, dies.^^
We have said earlier that a kitàb attested by two witnesses remains valid after the dismissal or death of the sending qàdi as long as it leaves his court before the change in his status takes place. This, however, is not the case with a kitàb attested as having been written by the sending qàdi. In other words, if the kitàb reaches the receiving qàdi after the dismissal or death of the sending qàdi, without the attestation of two witnesses, then it is rendered invalid despite the fact that the handwriting of the sending qàdi can be authenticated by witnesses. Here, Ibn al-Munásif affords us a glimpse into the legal practices of his day. At this point, he criticises a group of jurists who «nowadays went wrong concerning this sort» of written communications. They accepted the validity of kitàbs where the handwriting of the sending qàdi is attested after his death or dismissal, and treated this type of communication in the same fashion they treated writings attested and conveyed by two witnesses. It appears that his criticism was not that of a mere observer: he declares that this criticism culminated in a serious confrontation between him and these jurists.^'' «6 Ibid, [167] [168] [170] [171] wajaràfihi Our discussion would not be considered complete without giving some attention to the manner in which kitàb al-qàdi ilà al-qàdi was drafted by the jurists of the early seventh/thirteenth century Syria, North Africa and Muslim Spain. What our two authors and judges provide are examples of documents used in the world of practice. As we have said earher, both authors make general and specific references to the connections between what they expound as discursive doctrine and the actual reality on the ground. When they come to provide these documentary examples, which we call model formularies, they make it quite clear that these derive from mundane practice.^^ We have seen that Ibn alMunasif puts it in the most unambiguous of terms when he titles a sub-chapter: «Concerning the Forms of Writing Used Nowadays Among the Qadis. »^^ We begin with Ibn Abi al-Damm who affords us an example of a written communication concerning a debt which a qàdi confirmed as being owed to the plaintiff (the formulary being applicable to other cases as well).^^ First, the scribe must have at his disposal rectangular sheets of high quality, clear and glossy paper, which he should firmly glue together so as to produce a scroll. The scribe himself, in addition to being learned in the law, just and prudent, must have good handwriting and adequate knowledge of language and literature (adab). He should write in a neat and clear manner with a large round pen of the thuluth type,^^ the lines being straight and the individual words, as the lines, separated by appropriate space.
In the name of God, whom we trust and from whom we draw help. From he who stands in need of God's forgiveness and mercy [the name of the writing qàdi] the judge in the city of and in all its outskirts, districts and suburbs, and those adjacent to them; who has been validly and legally appointed, may God the Exalted bestow mercy upon him, to anyone who receives it (viz. this kitàb) among the qàdis of Mushms, may God be good to them.
In a separate sheet of paper, the scribe produces an exact copy of the document, known as madmün, which seems to have had a double function: The first, already noted by Ibn Abî al-Damm, is to remind the witnesses of the document's contents while travelling.^^ The second appears to be safeguarding against forgery and distortion. In addition to recording the contents of the document, including the deed and amount of debt (or any other relevant document), the madmün contains a description of the qàdi's insignia and where it was placed over the glued sheets. Furthermore, the contents of the seal are recorded, as well as the number of lines of which the entire document, including religious invocations, consists.^^ Once all this has been recorded, the qàdi places his insignia at the top and bottom of the madmün. But the madmün did not, by Ibn Abî al-Damm's admission, always contain an exact copy of the deed of debt as that registered in the kitàb. Some qàdis reportedly thought it sufficient to produce only a summary of it, while others refer to it without recording any of its contents.^'' Unlike Ibn Abî al-Damm, Ibn al-Munasif does not afford us a complete and composite picture of a formulaic example of kitàb, although what he has to say is of extraordinary value for learning about some of the practices of his day.^^ And unlike their Syrian counterparts, the Andalusian and Maghrebi qàdis appear to have recorded their communications on the margins, bottom or back of the document containing the deed or contract in question, and when that was not the case, they wrote it on a sheet of paper that was glued onto the bottom end of the document. We know this from what they wrote. When the deed was recorded at the botton, they wrote: «qàdi so and so was advised, as is required, of the legal validity of the deed (or contract) recorded above»; when the kitàb was recorded on the back of the deed or contract, the qàdi would state: «... the ^^ Ibn Abî al-Damm, Adab al-Qadà\ 349, and n. 56, above. ^^ Nuwayii, who lived a century later, makes the significant but general remark that recording the number of lines was neglected in the majority of documents. However, he makes no specific reference to kitàb al-qàdi. legal validity of the deed recorded on the verso of this sheet»; when it was recorded on the left margin, for instance, the qàdi writes: «... the legal validity of the deed recorded to the right side of this writing». But added caution was required when the kitàb was glued onto the deed or contract. In this case, the qadi states: «... the legal validity of the deed recorded on the above sheet that is glued onto (or «attached to» or «adjoined with»)^^ the present document, and which contains the deed of sale involving so and so and such and such». Here, a summary of the deed is given together with the full names of the parties to litigation and of their witnesses in order to ensure that no other deed, valid or not, is substituted for it with a view to achieve illegal ends. The same level of detail was also required when more than one deed was involved. Similarly, if two or three relevant deeds were recorded on a scroll together with other deeds irrelevant to the case at hand, the former deeds should be unambiguously specified in the same manner. The basic formula used in drafting the kitàb, according to Ibn al-Munàsif, is as follows: «The shaykh, the faqih, the qàdi so and so, may God give him support and success, is informed, as is required, of the validity of the deed recorded on the back of this document, by virtue of the testimony of the witnesses so and so on behalf of so and so [=name of the plaintiff]. This writing is effected by the judge so and so. Peace be upon you, as well as the mercy and blessings of God.» It is to be noted that naming the receiving qàdi before mentioning the writer's own name seems to be a distinctly Andalusian and North African practice whose declared purpose was showing respect to the qàdi addressed.
Unlike Ibn Abï al-Damm who takes the recording of the date of writing for granted, Ibn al-Munàsif only recommends dating the document. ^^^ This is rather surprising, since the vaHdity of the kitàb, in the event of the qàdfs dismissal or death, hinges on the exact time in which it was drafted and sealed. But this is only one of a number of formal and substantive differences in the documentary practices of the two regions. The Syrian kitàb is independent in that it is normally recorded on a separate sheet or scroll of paper, and the deeds or contracts relevant to the case are copied down as part of the kitàb, in a way subsidiary to it. In Andalusia and the Maghreb, on the other hand, the qàdT^ kitàb is physically secondary, in the sense that it is an attachment to the deeds ^^ The Arabic word here is muqarrata, meaning adjoined together by means of punching holes on the side of the document where a ribbon, usually sealed with wax, is used to tie the sheets together.
'^ The Malikite Kinànï, on the other hand, considers dating as an integral part of the document. http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es or contracts in dispute. The Syrian kitàb is also appreciably more elaborate; the writing is more formal, lengthy, ornamental and replete with flowery language speaking of the qadis involved, their lofty posts and the mighty dynasty and government which appointed them. But the elaborateness here also has a legal function. The Syrian kitàb details the particulars of the evidentiary procedure, and pays close attention to the role of witnesses in the case. On the other hand, the Andalusian/Maghrebi kitàb seems significantly shorter, to the point, and less concerned with evidentiary procedure. Its formulas are more flexible, allowing for a number of variations (which reflect the regional practices). ^^^ There is also less stress on formal requirements, such as the manner in which names are to be recorded and testimony to be transmitted. Conspicuous also is the absence of the madmün, which seems to have been the result of the admissibility of handwriting in Málikite adjectival law.
VI
An examination of the formal rules governing kitàb aUqàdi ilà al-qàdi in adab aUqàdi works makes it immediately obvious that the very justification of these rules lies in the undeniable need for this type of written instrument and in the widespread practice that this need generated. The formalization (and even domestication) of this pervasive practice through consensus not only amounted to a powerful acknowledgment of a procedural rule that would have otherwise been inadmissible, but it also elevated the law and, consequently, the practice of it to the highest epistemic value. In other words, it transposed what would have otherwise been an unlawful popular practice into an epistemologically unshakable adjectival law. Though the epistemic leap in and by itself is somewhat irrelevant to judicial practice, it is for us significantly indicative of the coercive power of custom in penetrating formal legal discourse and in rising, within the hierarchy of that discourse, to the highest authoritative position.
It is then readily arguable that in at least its broad outlines, the legal discourse subsumed under kitàb al-qàdi -even in the most morbidly formal texts-indistinguishably amalgamates the theoretical and the practical, the ideal and the real. Being formal only to some extent, our two sources, presumably model manuals, have come to reveal a great deal of information http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es about the legal praxis relative to kitàb al-qàdi in Syria, Andalusia and the Maghreb. In their discourse is embedded a constant and fairly steady inclination to relate law to social reality, by way of open references or subtle allusions. Both references and allusions demonstrate a remarkable sensitivity to the realm of social existence that was the ultimate destination of the law. It may be tempting to argue that much of the discourse remains formally ideal, bearing little upon mundane reality. But this would be rather simplistic. The praxis-content of discourse may often be determined by positive allusions and outright declarations; but at times it can be inferred through the e silentio argument -and the best form of it at that. Consider, for instance, Ibn alMunàsif, who was widely known in professional circles as an ardent critic of his contemporaries. ^°^ On a number of occasions in the section he devoted to kitàb al-qàdi, and generally throughout the book, he advances a number of critical statements against the practices of his peers and contemporaries. Any reader of his work will immediately sense not only the author's intimate knowledge of legal practice, but also his penchant to criticise. And here the reader must indeed wonder why Ibn al-Munàsif would often pass in silence over cases of legal practice, whereas in other cases, he would heap his critical wrath. In light of the relatively heavy presence of discourse on juridical practice in Ibn al-Munàsif work, it would not be entirely implausible to argue that wherever he passes in silence over a doctrine or precept relating to kitàb aUqàdi, the doctrine or precept must tentatively be assumed to have a implemented analogue in the world of juridical practice. ^^^ Although the similarities that the two works offer are illustrative, they are the least interesting, nonetheless. What is rather significant is the enormous difference, a difference which vehemently argues against the perception of a monoHthic nature of Islamic law, and in favour of the absence of a gap between doctrine and practice. What began as fairly similar legal doctrines in the third/ninth century Malikite and Shafi'ite schools ended up being considerably different, and this difference, as we have seen, was due in no small part to the profound divergence of the two regional practices we have considered. But the absence of a gap must now become a forgone conclusion although a general theory of the relationship between the formal discourse of the manuals and that of practice still needs to be constructed and articulated. What is also needed now is to take a step further in identifying the manner in which the two types of discourse affected and modified one another. Our present study has shown »02 Ibid., [20] [21] 171, 181, 184, 187, má passim. Ï03 Cf. Hailaq, «Model Shumt Works», 134, n. 100 . http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es
